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regional and worldwide recognition and is posturing itself with a historically-proven military ‗active defense' culture within their military space programs.
The US response to China's emerging threat is slow and under-prioritized. This lack of a response is apparent with a current unbalanced national strategy for China and sub-standard funding levels for significant national and DoD military space acquisition programs. Competing national security priorities such as the GWOT are crippling the ability for the US to provide the best response to overmatch China's rise in military space power.
Through the use of open source information, this research follows a problem/solution methodology to address the above problems in reacting to China's rise in military space. The solution to this problem recommends five building-blocks or steps that if adopted, can enable new US leadership to better posture its national strategy, funding priorities, and its guidance to Geographical Combatant Commander's (GCCs) to adequately address China's military space capability. For instance, one recommendation is to implement a stronger military Instrument of Power (IOP) to complement the US's existing diplomatic and economic emphasis with China.
To achieve a solution, the US must find a way to encourage China to be more transparent with its military space intentions.
Introduction
At the dawn of the 2009 Obama administration, the new commander in chief has a full foreign policy agenda with a focus on deterring worldwide terrorism, hunting down al-Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden in Pakistan, stabilizing Iraq and Afghanistan, quelling Iran's nuclear efforts, repressing Israel and Palestine conflicts, and massaging a resurging Russia.
1 With these foreign policy distractions, it would be unfortunate and regrettable if relations with China move downward on the President's list of national security priorities. Even though current foreign relations with China appear to be admirable, China's recent economic rise and specifically, its rise in military space power, is beginning to deserve as much attention as other foreign policy issues, so much so that it should be elevated in the national strategy of the United States.
The purpose of this research is to address US shortfalls in national strategy and defense space funding which are required to adequately respond to China's rise in military space power.
This US response to China's military space power warrants a deeper look at geo-political considerations. Failure to concentrate adequately on the East Asia region may result in unintended consequences of accepting too much political and military risk with China.
Using various open source researched information, this paper will attempt to answer two underlying geo-political questions with respect to China and its rise in space power. First, do US leaders believe China's claim that national motives for developing space power are for peaceful purposes-in other words, should the US view the build-up as an act of stabilization in the region or an act of war? If the answer is the latter, then US leadership must answer a second question of what is the appropriate US strategic response to China's rise in space power and is that response curtailed by precedence given to other competing defense priorities.
To support the paper's thesis, this research will incorporate a qualitative problem/solution methodology. The problem presented is that China is an aggressive space-faring nation and the US is not developing effective national strategy and space policy to deal with the problem. The five-step solution suggested by this research includes strengthening the national strategy and national space policy with a focus on using space a deterrent to China's rising threat.
Implementation of this solution would aim to instill an increased commitment to adequately fund appropriate space acquisition programs to successfully overmatch the Chinese space threat.
To dissect this problem/solution, the research will first frame the problem by exploring the threat of China's rise in military space power and their geo-political intentions involving space capability to further national interests. Second, the paper will explore why China's rise is a growing dilemma for the US by looking at an unbalanced National Security Strategy (NSS), National Defense Strategy (NDS), Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), and National Space
Policy. Third, it will investigate how funding other priorities such as GWOT come at the expense of space acquisition programs. Finally, the research will propose a five-step solution for the national strategy to contest China's emerging threat. Based on a geo-political perspective however, our nation's NSS, NDS, NMS/QDR and National Space Policy need to be more forceful and consistent when addressing China's military space ability. In addition, these national strategies and policy require critical ‗adjustments' as the former STRATCOM commander suggested in the quote above in order to enjoy ‗unfettered access to space systems' for years to come. Everett Dolman confirms this thought that today's US space strategy is elusive and contradictory by suggesting that it is -not decisive, guiding, or
The latest 2006 NSS document should set the tone for all other strategy, policy and funding. As evidenced in sections six and ten, this document's primary focus on China is that of financial cooperation and globalization challenges rather than pursuing an active military defense against rising or asymmetric space threats. In section eight, ‗developing agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global power', paragraph seven is entirely devoted to addressing East Asia. President Bush refers to the region as one with -great opportunities and lingering tensions‖. 37 Rather than reading about a military response to an emerging threat however, the strategy chooses to focus almost exclusively on the economic and diplomatic
instruments of power (IOP). An example of this peaceful economic partnering with China is to
press for open markets, financial stability, and deeper integration.
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The 2006 NSS suggests forging new international (economic) initiatives and institutions to spread freedom, prosperity, and security of the East Asia region. 39 Once again, rather than a military build-up solution, the strategy strives for diplomacy and economic prosperity via institution building. An example cited is to form and enhance new arrangements or partnerships such as the US-Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) partnership which focuses on problem-solving. While these economic and diplomatic focus areas are an essential step to long term prosperity with China, they do not directly address a near-term response to their rising military (space) capability.
With the knowledge that China is a current and future emerging threat, it is perplexing that the NSS gives the benefit of the doubt that China will continue to operate under a ‗peaceful development' umbrella. On this subject, the NSS states:
China's leaders proclaim that they have made a decision to walk the transformative path of peaceful development. If China keeps this commitment, the United States will welcome the emergence of a China that is peaceful and prosperous and that cooperates with us to address common challenges and mutual interests…The United States encourages China to continue down the road of reform and openness, because in this way China's leaders can meet the legitimate needs and aspirations of the Chinese people for liberty, stability, and prosperity. In the ‗future challenges risk' section, the NDS acknowledges that China is developing technologies to disrupt US traditional advantages. 46 The NDS mentions that in order to hedge against this loss or disruption of these traditional advantages it will handle them with -mitigation strategies‖ and -alternative parallel means‖, neither of which are well defined.
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Nevertheless, the NDS is on a good path acknowledging China as a potential threat to national security, citing Chinese counter-space threats of anti-satellite attack and cyber warfare.
This addition to the NDS opens the way for the US to develop military solutions that counter
China's developing counter-space technologies. This acknowledgement could lead to securing additional DoD counter-space funding and technology development that match China's efforts.
Cyber warfare is an important addition to the strategy that should cause US decision makers to consider how to best militarily protect its terrestrial-based control segments of space systems. 
The Funding

"The U.S. military now has fewer resources to build up the capabilities to win a potential war with China over Taiwan. This is a goal Chinese diplomacy has, on its own, never managed to achieve…until Iraq." -Steve Tsang, Former Director of the Asian Studies Centre, Oxford University
One assumption why national Strategy may be lacking a solid military response is that by design, guidance from national strategy dictates the prioritization of DoD funding, to include space acquisition programs. If national strategy were to place China as a higher objective over other priorities, or even address a military response more repeatedly, the DoD would place itself in a dilemma to fund programs at the expense of other worldwide priorities such as the GWOT.
It may be easier for senior US leaders to simply assume the risk of a rising China since the US defense budget may not be able to afford the cost of maintaining space superiority over China without sacrificing other national security priorities and programs.
An unintended consequence of assuming this risk however is that national strategy may
give the perception of a hollow promise to take action against China's noncompliance if ELINT capability were acquired and used in concert with their overhead imagery capability. 78 In this scenario, denying an adversary access to space information becomes essential.
Regardless of the debate of who has space superiority over the East Asia region, it is difficult to ignore China's aggressive rise in military space capability. China already has a notable space capable arsenal of imagery, communication, navigation, remote sensing, meteorology, and previously mentioned offensive anti-satellite capabilities. In addition, a 2006
Pentagon report claimed that the Chinese Huanjing program is fielding up to eight satellites to provide visible, infrared, multi-spectral, and synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imaging capability. show of force backed by solid national strategy, policy and funding of military space programs.
Step 1 From a novice interpretation of current national strategy and policy documents, US policymakers do not view China's space build-up as a ‗front-burner' issue. This is evident as mentioned earlier in the paper under the unbalanced strategy section where national strategic and defense focus areas and objectives, as well as national space policy concentrate almost exclusively on a peaceful development solution to tame China's rise. According to the CNA think tank, it is -quite possible for China to catch up with the United States in, for example, a 20-year time frame.‖ 82 The national strategy and space policy should reflect this sense of urgency.
As discussed in part 1, since the Chinese are intent on developing their space capabilities, keeping an eye on their new space development and making sure the US is matching it with requisite capabilities of its own becomes even more imperative.
The final consideration of step 1 is the timeliness of national strategy and policy revisions. While frequent intelligence assessments are likely given on China's space threat to US leaders and policymakers, the follow-on guidance and policy on how to effectively use the best mix of IOPs for China cannot afford to wait every other year or every four in the form of a national strategy or policy update. Instead, a specific space policy for addressing China's space capability should be developed and kept current for military and political leaders to reference often. If a US government over-consumed with other foreign policy matters prevents the creation of a China-specific policy, they should seek out reputable past performers such as the RAND cooperation to propose a suggested single strategy to address China.
Step 2 Although the incumbent Defense Secretary remains at the helm of the department under the new administration, there is still room for improvement with respect to the NDS and how it addresses China's threat militarily. As an example, the NDS could have better balance between its stated current objectives and how it proposes to manage current and future risk. The NDS should strengthen its position that China is not merely a future threat, but deserving of a contingent military response today. The next update to the NDS should raise the priority on US space control to better posture its own space forces to address China's space military capability.
As a fall-out of the NDS, the next CJCS-driven QDR or NMS should be updated to include space assets or capability to its ‗deter conflict' section, to -aid the ability to prevent attack‖ and -respond decisively to any attack‖ in dissuading potential adversaries. 83 US military counter-space power can help achieve this critical objective and add to other deterrents mentioned in the QDR such as a solid nuclear arsenal and missile defense. Therefore, the NDS should contain stronger language in line with National Space Policy on the President's number one guidance to the Secretary of Defense on space control and space force application missions.
As pointed out in the unbalanced strategy section, the 2006 National Space Policy is not without its need for adjustments as well. The one aspect of the policy that should not change is keeping the counter-space guidance to the SecDef. This guidance should however make its way into the NSS since the POTUS is the author of both documents. As previously suggested, the next National Space Policy should include additional guidelines to militarily counter emerging space-faring nations such as China. In addition to the right to self-defense of US space assets for peaceful purposes, the National Space Policy should include a dictum to demonstrate the ability to offensively deny an adversary access to space, especially in times of war or if US space assets are known to be threatened. This policy change would essential advocate an inclusion of offensive counter-space to the current, defensive only counter-space military option.
Step 3: Increase national and DoD space budgets as funding for GWOT decreases, even if a
US-China military space race ensues
Although it is not clear how long the Long War (GWOT) will consume a good portion of the annual US defense budget, increasing DoD funding to space programs is critical not only in supporting the GWOT, but also in deterring threatening space-faring nations such as China.
The argument to maintain the space control advantage is emphasized from General Thomas D.
White's statement, -capability to deter war is enhanced by the ability to control space and that, in future wars, space control will be coequal with air and sea control.‖ 84 Today's DoD budget however does not reflect an equal funding stream of air-land-sea-space and cyber domains.
In order for the US to be successful with deterring China's rise in space power, they need to be first to the punch -they must establish and maintain an aggressive offense to develop, procure and posture US military space assets similar to the effort given during the nuclear arms race of the Cold War. Leading space theorists such as Jim Oberg and Everett Dolman suggest that weaponizing space is inevitable. 85 If this is to be the case, the US cannot afford to lose this race of controlling space. Oberg agrees that the US cannot afford to lose this opportunity (to be the first to field them), otherwise it will likely find itself held hostage to the state that does.
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Whatever the solution, a geo-political consideration to tactfully assess this space race is required so as not to diminish the years of good economic relations with China.
The US cannot be first to the punch without the proper care, feeding, and funding of its space acquisition programs. Consistent with rebalanced national strategies and space policy, the funding to these types of R&D centers and space acquisition product centers is a small price to pay to maintain the upper hand over China in emerging space technology. With an increase of funding, however, the efficiency of the space acquisition workforce and its programs must find a better path of rigor and execution to keep space programs on schedule and within budget.
Step 4: Provide relevant space guidance to PACOM AOR campaign planners given conflict. Explicit guidance will help the GCC posture for an asymmetric or preemptive space attack from China.
Step 5: Push for space cooperation with China to increase transparency and reduce 'worst-
case' planning
Once a solid revised national strategy, robust space acquisition funding levels, and GCC contingency plans are in place, US decision makers and warfighters need to know when and how to best employ them. 
Conclusion
The research in this paper endeavored to frame a real security threat facing the US military today and in the near future, that of a rising military space capability in China. Through a realism-based lens, this paper framed a national security problem by exploring China's national strategic ambitions for space, and a sample of their recent military space developments and actions. This problem continues with evidence of unbalanced US national strategic guidance and policy towards China which drives a lack of adequate US military space program funding.
To consider China's military space threat, US leaders can begin by referring to military guidance given in JP 3-14, Space Operations. It admonishes the US military to know the adversary and to understand their access to, use of, and dependency on space systems. It gives commanders a warning to -maintain awareness of threats to space forces in their AORs and take measures to preempt or counter those threats in order to preserve US freedom of action in, and access to, space.‖ 90 This estimate is ever so true with the military space threat of China today.
To consider the unbalanced national strategy which drives the funding, US leaders can follow recent principles behind the 2008 NDS. Explaining the intent of the 2008 NDS, Defense
Secretary Gates suggests that, -the defining principle driving our strategy is balance‖ and that the DoD -must set priorities and consider inescapable opportunity costs.‖ 91 The national strategy indeed needs to set China as one of these priorities to better seek this balance. If not, the US will miss the opportunity to be fully prepared to combat China's space capability when called upon.
This problem deserves a more specific US strategic and military response to maintain the space edge to overmatch China's emerging space threat. The response is one of complexity, due to the dilemma of choosing national security priorities and funding of the GWOT at the expense of other defense priorities such as military space. Despite its challenges however, the solution to this problem begins with US leadership re-evaluating their view of China's military space capability, followed by including stronger military space IOP guidance in its national strategy, and then by increasing funding to US defense space acquisition programs. These steps will then allow GCCs across the globe to fully plan and incorporate space capability into their campaigns.
All of these steps may be of limited worth however if the US cannot find a way to cooperate with China and gain more transparency into their true intentions of military space.
China's military space threat is real. The US national response should be just as real.
Near-term US strategy, policy and funding are critical requirements to provide a more tangible, realistic strategic response to emerging threats from space-faring nations such as China. 
